In matching environments where agents have private information, intermediaries face special challenges. Using a mechanism design approach, this paper develops sufficient conditions for a version of assortative matching that accommodates price discrimination to be incentive compatible and profit-or welfare-maximizing. When the conditions are not satisfied, informational externalities can arise between partners that lead to coordination problems, even when the matching is positively assortative. When the conditions are satisfied, two-sided position auctions implement the optimal match and payments, but unbalanced markets can lead to nonexistence of increasing, pure strategy equilibria when agents make payments only when they receive a match.
Introduction
The presence of intermediaries in today's economy is ubiquitous, including the network of brokers and exchanges that form the global financial system and the Internet Service Providers connecting users to content producers. The presence of these agents raise a number of questions: How do they exploit their position to make profits, and what is their impact on efficiency? When do they choose to incentivize participants to disclose information about themselves honestly, and what limitations does this place on the pursuit of efficiency or stability? What kinds of market designs, such as auctions or posted prices, are optimal for intermediating relationships among economic agents?
The answers to these questions are not purely of theoretical interest. Markets are increasingly being organized on the Internet, where intermediaries attempt to match workers to firms for a fee. Examples include online spot labor markets like Elance.com, which reported over $400 million in completed contracts to date in August, 2011, and peer-to-peer lending sites have emerged, such as Prosper.com, which reports intermediating $255 million in personal loans to date in August, 2011. More traditional labor market intermediaries include executive search firms such as Heidrick and Struggles or Korn/Ferry International, where firms seeking to fill vacant positions approach head-hunters, who cultivate a pool of candidates meeting the firms' criteria. Firms compete for qualified workers by reporting a wage offer for a suitable candidate, while the headhunter solicits information from potential candidates such as minimum salaries required for them to change jobs, creating a two-sided bidding market. In these markets, the intermediaries receive a percentage of the wages reported by the firms or the interest rate and size attached to the loans, which should be seen as bids that are strategically influenced by the market design chosen by the intermediary. This paper clarifies the strategic nature of these market designs by providing a theoretical framework which synthesizes matching and price discrimination.
Consider a market that is split into two distinct sides, where each agent can produce surplus only by matching to a partner on the opposite side. All participants privately know their quality as a partner, which indexes agents from worst to best. If the match surplus for each agent is increasing in each agent's quality and exhibits supermodularity, an intermediary could maximize profits and efficiency simply by ranking the agents on both sides, matching the highest-ranked agents together, the second-highest, and so on, and charging the matched agents up to their willingness to pay. This pattern of matching is called positive assortative matching, and has long been recognized to be socially efficient in such an environment. However, if the agents' quality information is private and the matchmaker naively asks them to report their quality, the agents have an incentive to lie about their desirability to secure a better match, creating a case of two-sided adverse selection.
This paper uses a mechanism design framework to make a number of contributions to understanding how matching markets with externalities and intermediaries function. First, sufficient conditions are provided that ensure both that the intermediary will choose a version of positive assortative matching and the participants will reveal their information to the market honestly. This requires a number of conditions that are familiar from previous studies in matching and mechanism design: supermodularity of the surplus functions and a monotone likelihood ratio condition. However, without the assumption of decreasing supermodularity, the revenue from a match may become submodular, leading the matchmaker to adopt negative assortative matching, placing the best agents with the worst partners. An example is provided where the matchmaker prefers negative assortative matching to positive assortative matching ex ante with any desired probability. This illustrates that supermodularity and the monotone likelihood ratio condition are not sufficient to ensure positive assortative matching, and coarse matching where the market is partially separated and agents are randomly matched within market segments, can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon for a variety of reasons. Even when the matchmaker prefers positive assortative matching, the game may not induce incentive compatible play from the agents. In particular, increasing the quality of a matched agent has two effects: The match becomes more valuable socially, but the bargaining position of the agent's partner is improved against the matchmaker. If the second effect dominates, the matchmaker may choose to destroy the match. This can create an informational coordination problem between partners and potential violations of incentive compatibility.
The matchmaker will not, in general, choose to match agents efficiently. In particular, he will refuse to arrange low-quality but socially valuable matches, especially in the presence of matching costs. This leads to two kinds of exclusion: Absolute exclusion where some types of agents expect a payoff of zero from participating almost surely, and relative exclusion where agents who expect to receive a partner ex ante are unlucky, and their potential partner has too low a quality to warrant a match. This version of positive assortative matching with some exclusion at the bottom is referred to as truncated assortative matching throughout the paper. If the sufficient conditions for truncated assortative matching to be profit-maximizing and incentive compatible are met, a revenue equivalence theorem holds and the optimal match can be implemented through bidding games where all agents submit a single sealed bid, and then the matchmaker opens and ranks the bids, matching the highest-bidding agents together, the second-highest-bidding agents, and so on, until the remaining agents are denied a match or no eligible partners remain on one side. This two-sided position auction maximizes revenue and extracts the true quality rankings, rewarding the higher bidding agents by giving them more desirable partners. This market structure shares many characteristics with the competitive bidding in wages or interest rates witnessed in labor or lending markets as well as the proportional fees collected by the intermediaries, providing one agents are matched on the rank of their signal. Hoppe et al. provide conditions under which costly signaling can improve welfare over random matching but do not consider how an intermediary would design a market to achieve objectives like profit-or welfare-maximization, and their paper is mainly a positive analysis of costly signaling in the tradition of Spence [42] . However, all matches in their model are socially valuable, which is not the case in many real-world markets that suffer from adverse selection. If the surplus on one side is q i q j , but the surplus on the other side is q i q j −ε, there are matches which are individually rational on the first side but not on the second, and agents may refuse their partner ex post. Consequently, the link between the Vickrey mechanism and the externalities imposed on others by participating in the auction will break down, and many of the results of the Hoppe et al. analysis no longer apply since externalities of participation can no longer be expressed as the sums and differences of the expected values of order statistics. In this paper, the introduction of a matchmaker coincides with price discrimination, but also a degree of screening which can potentially stop these outcomes that are asymmetrically unprofitable across the market. Moreover, matchmakers can achieve efficient matching, despite the fact that an extension of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to incomplete information matching settings is no longer incentive compatible (see Proposition 3.2). The analysis of this paper is useful because markets that involve the risk of bad outcomes for some participants or mis-coordination are precisely the kind in which an intermediary might profitably enter. In the current paper, assumptions such as positivity or multiplicative separability of the surplus functions are not invoked, and only assumptions about the signs of derivatives and the relationship to the hazard rates of the players' type distributions are made.
Damiano and Li [13] consider a monopolist matchmaker that wants to organize "meeting places" with posted entry fees in a manner that induces agents to self-select in an assortative fashion. Their approach is to exploit similarities between a monopolist constructing a price-quality schedule and a matchmaker trying to induce agents to self-select into a given meeting place, allowing them to arrive at conclusions about how inefficiency arises through price discrimination efforts. They conclude that revenue-maximization tends to lead to improvements in matching efficiency, unless the matchmaker engages in pooling. Their results, however, rely heavily on the assumption of a continuum of agents on both sides of the market, random or assortative matching within meeting places, and multiplicatively separable surplus functions. In this paper, it is shown that with a finite number of agents, a profit-maximizing matchmaker will generally engage in inefficient price discrimination and exclusion, and their conclusions about efficiency do not hold. Additionally, for assortative matching to be optimal they require supermodularity of the matchmaker's revenue from a match at all quantiles of the population, but this is a local criterion that must hold along the set of matches and does not readily apply to a finite population. Similarly, supermodularity of the matchmaker's revenue from a match is a necessary condition for a version of assortative matching to be profit maximizing, but not sufficient for it to be incentive compatible: Knowing that the matchmaker will prefer to match agents assortatively does not imply that the agents want to reveal their type honestly through market competition when exclusion occurs. Similarly, with a finite and potentially small number of agents, the use of meeting places is inefficient: With positive probability, the numbers of agents in various meeting places will be unbalanced, leading to missed opportunities for matches. The indirect implementations studied in Section 4 of this paper avoid these difficulties by allowing the matchmaker to design markets that more closely resemble auctions rather than posted price mechanisms (though of course, in the limit, the outcomes will coincide).
Lastly, Gomes [18] considers a mechanism design framework in which a finite number of agents on both sides of the market receive signals about their preferences for partners on the opposite side, and an intermediary platform constructs a revelation mechanism to match one firm to the users who find it profitable to pay an entry fee. This framework is modelled after Internet search, where firms are induced to reveal information honestly to the platform, who then sells one firm the right to match with users who are still willing to participate. In the framework of this paper, the matchmaker is attempting to match users and firms one-to-one -rather than many-to-oneand receives messages from both sides, rather than just the firms.
Model
There are two disjoint sets of agents, I and J, with K I agents on the I side and K J agents on the J side; let K = min{K I , K J }, which is the largest number of matches that can be arranged in this market. Each I-side agent would like to match to one agent on the J side, and each agent on the J side would like to match to one agent on the I side. Each I-side agent has a privately known quality drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F I (q), with support on [0,q I ], with q j defined likewise. Let q I = (q I1 , q I2 , ..., q IK I ) be a vector of types for all the agents on the I side, and q J defined similarly. Let q I\i = (q I1 , q I2 , ..., q Ii−1 , q Ii+1 , ..., q IK I ), the vector of types from the I side where the i-th entry is removed, so that q I = (q i , q I\i ). For a vector X = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x i , ..., x K ) with some component x i , let ρ X (x i ) be the rank of x i in X:
where |A| is the number of elements in a set A. So ρ X (x i ) = 5 implies that there are 5 elements in X greater than or equal to x i , including itself, and if ρ X (x i ) = 1, it is the largest element in X. For an arbitrary function h(q I , q J ), let
This is the expectation of h(q I , q J ) conditional on i's information; it can be read as "agent i's expectation of h(q i , q j )".
Agents who are matched produce pairwise private surpluses s I (q i , q j ) for the I-side agent and s J (q j , q i ) for the J-side agent; this can be thought of as truly private surplus, in the case of a marriage between two individuals who derive value from each others' company, or as the equilibrium payoff from a complete information, non-cooperative game played after the matching game that satisfies appropriate restrictions. Surplus is a function of both agents' qualities, increasing in both arguments, and differentiable.
Agents have quasi-linear preferences, so an agent i paying t to match to agent j receives a payoff of
Let the cost schedule of arranging matches be c = {c 1 , c 2 , ..., c K }, independent of the realized qualities and reports. This can be interpreted as the bureaucratic cost to the matchmaker associated with arranging the consummation of the match or the cost of the legal burden of connecting agents, such as background checks, insurance against civil lawsuits, and investigating potential fraud. Additionally, if it is a strictly increasing schedule with c k+1 > c k , there will be congestion effects in the market. This can be observed in telecommunications markets, for example, where Internet Service Providers are often forced to downgrade service when volume is unexpectedly high, or real estate markets where agents have too many clients to take on new ones. Conversely, if c k+1 < c k , there are economies to scale of matching, and more volume is better. This might be the case where insurance or background checks are required, and the matchmaker can more easily secure financing or related services when they arrange many matches.
A direct revelation mechanism is a set of functions
that take the type spaces of the agents as arguments, where m ijk (q I , q J ) is the probability that i is matched at the k-th slot to j given types q I and q J , t i (q I , q J ) is the amount paid by agent i given q I and q J , and t j (q I , q J ) is the amount paid by agent j given q I and q J . Consider the direct revelation mechanism as a non-cooperative game where agents each simultaneously announce a type -not necessarily truthfully -and get the payoff associated with their announced type, given the announcements of all the other players. Then the revelation principle asserts that given any game of incomplete information and an equilibrium for that game, there exists a direct revelation mechanism where truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the outcomes are the same as the original equilibrium payoffs.
As a consequence of the revelation principle, we imagine that the matchmaker announces the mechanism to the agents, the agents then strategically report a type or decide not to participate, and then are matched and make payments according to the mechanism. To ensure that truthtelling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the announcement game, incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are imposed. Since this thought experiment characterizes all the implementable mechanisms, the profit-or welfare-maximizing mechanism can be found and characterized. With such a characterization available, any game can then be analyzed to see if it implements the same outcome, and is therefore an optimal indirect implementation.
Since agents have quasi-linear preferences, agent i has an indirect utility function from participating in a given mechanism of
Since no special distinctions are made between the I side and the J side of the market all analysis will apply equally to both sides, so discussion will focus on the I side, but all findings hold with the appropriate permutations of indices for the J side.
Direct Revelation Mechanisms
To fix ideas, suppose the matchmaker seeks to maximize expected profits (welfare maximization will be considered later):
subject to individual rationality constraints and incentive compatibility constraints: The mechanism is individually rational if, for all agents i on the I side with true quality q i , and similarly for all agents j on the J side,
and the mechanism is incentive compatible if, for all agents i on the I side and similarly for all agents j on the J side, and for all q ′ not equal to the agent's true type q i ,
The incentive compatibility constraints require that no agent finds it in his best interests to lie about his type, while the individual rationality constraints require that no agent who participates receives a lower payoff than if he had refused to participate at all. In particular, they ensure that truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the announcement game. Define q I as the agent on the I side with the lowest q that chooses to participate, rather than withdraw from the market and receive a payoff of zero. 
and (ii) the monotonicity condition that for q ′ = q,
This proposition provides criteria that any incentive compatible matching mechanism must satisfy. However, there are already a number of market designs that have desirable incentive properties in other environments, such as the Gale-Shapley algorithm, serial random dictatorship, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.
3.1 The Gale-Shapley Algorithm, Serial Random Dictatorship, and the VickreyClarke-Groves Mechanism
Before considering general mechanisms with transfers, it is useful to consider the incentive properties of existing market designs such as the Gale-Shapley algorithm or the VCG mechanism. Roth [35] has shown that, in general, there does not exist a direct revelation mechanism that implements truth-telling in weakly dominant strategies and chooses a stable match. However, when considering increasing, supermodular preferences s I (q i , q j ) and s J (q j , q i ), then there is a unique stable match for all realizations of types in the corresponding complete information game. Consequently, it might be assumed that serial random dictatorship (SRD) and the Gale-Shapley algorithm would still achieve stable and efficient matching in this environment, but that is false.
To convert these mechanisms into a form suitable for this incomplete information environment, the matchmaker computes all the imputed match valuesŝ ij = s I (q i ,q j ) andŝ ji = s J (q j ,q i ), and then uses the following rule to compute the matches and payments:
• SRD: Then the matchmaker randomly picks an agent i or j who is currently single and matches him to the agent who yields the highest surplus value. This process is repeated until all the agents are matched.
• The Gale-Shapley algorithm: In "virtual time", the matchmaker computes the I-optimal stable match relative to the reports:
-In the first virtual round, each agent i on the I side "proposes" to the J-side agent who yields the highest imputed match value to agent i. The agents on the J side conditionally accept the proposing I side agent who gives them the highest imputed match value, and all agents whose proposal was rejected remain single.
-In each subsequent virtual round, all single agents on the I side propose to their next best preferred agent on the J side according to the imputed match values. The J side agents either retain their current partner or accept a new proposal.
-This process terminates when either all the agents on the I or J side are matched, or all of the single agents on the I side have proposed to all the agents on the J side for whichŝ ij ≥ 0.
• The VCG mechanism: The matchmaker chooses the allocation of partners that maximizes
Each agent pays his imputed impact on social surplus:
In a pure private values environment where agents' preferences over partners are independent of the realized signals of the other agents, as in Roth [35] , serial random dictatorship is incentive compatible, and the Gale-Shapley algorithm is incentive compatible for the proposing side. In auction theory, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is incentive compatible, for example, when bidders have unit demand and private values. This proposition holds because the messages in this environment express willingness to pay for a partner, but they also influence how the other agents form preferences over partners. By lying, an agent can gain an advantage by manipulating how the other side of the market perceives him or her. This motive is absent from, for example, Roth [35] where each agent knows his preferences over partners exactly, so agents only care about a potential partner's type insofar as it gives them information about the likelihood of achieving him as a partner. In this pairwise private values environment, agents now care about the types of their partners because it factors into their surplus functions. Consequently, agents can manipulate the matchmaker and the opposite side of the market by sending a message that overstates their quality.
Profit-Maximizing Matchmaking
Through standard mechanism design arguments, interim expected transfers can be isolated for any incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism:
Then ex ante expected transfers can be found through an integration by parts:
This can be interpreted as the marginal revenue accruing to the matchmaker from agent i when he is matched to agent j. Then
Substituting this expression for expected transfers into the matchmaker's problem yields an equivalent program:
subject to the monotonicity condition. So the matchmaker's problem is reduced to choosing a matching function on the basis of the reports, with the transfers eliminated. The monotonicity condition requires that the matchmaker assign a more advantageous lottery over partners to agents who report higher types. Consider the relaxed program where the monotonicity condition is dropped:
By inspection of the objective function for the relaxed program, it is evident that the matchmaker refuses to put any agents together at the k-th slot who satisfy ψ I (q i , q j )+ ψ J (q j , q i ) < c k , since such a match generates negative profits. Consider the match function that pairs agents assortatively, putting the best I agent with the best J agent, the second-best I agent with the second-best J agent, and so on, but stops when a pair generates negative revenue for the matchmaker:
This mechanism has the notable property that for those agents who receive a match, the allocation is only dependent on rankings of the agents' qualities, not on the realization of qualities per se. This feature allows agents to contemplate whether they will attain a certain rank when formulating their strategies, rather that sorting through different possible realizations of all their opponents' qualities.
Proposition 3.3 (Assignment-Optimality of TAM)
If the virtual surplus function is supermodular and the cost schedule is weakly increasing, then TAM is a solution to the relaxed matching problem. A set of sufficient conditions for this to be true is that the surplus functions be supermodular
and the monotone likelihood ratio property holds:
The key to the proof is that virtual surplus must also be supermodular to guarantee that assortative matching is profit-maximizing in this environment. To ensure this, three conditions are required: the monotone likelihood ratio property, supermodularity, and decreasing supermodularity. The requirement that the cost schedule be weakly increasing ensures that revenue under assortative matching is weakly decreasing in the number of matches made. Otherwise, the matchmaker will still prefer an assortative match, but will have to check the profits for each of the K truncated assortative matches to find the most profitable one. This introduces another potential channel for manipulation, since an agent might overstate his type in the hopes that the matchmaker will then choose to make a much larger number of matches. The monotone likelihood ratio property is often invoked in the mechanism design literature, and many common distributions satisfy it, such as the Normal family, the exponential, the Pareto, and the uniform distributions (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom [1] ).
Decreasing supermodularity has the economic interpretation that the "synergy" between the two parties is jointly decreasing in their types. This is observed, for example, in situations where a group of professional musicians or athletes are matched for a performance or game and the result is relatively "disappointing": Since professionals are already quite capable, the gains from complementarity have already largely been exhausted and further consolidation of talent results in a less dramatic improvement in match surplus. Technically, this condition brings stability to the market: If even the lowest-quality agents on one side found it profitable to bid aggressively in an attempt to get the best partner on the other side of the market due to quality externalities, the matchmaker may fail to be able to separate the types, forcing him -in the most extreme caseto adopt a lottery and pool the types. Under this condition, such a case is ruled out.
If any of the other conditions conditions are violated, the matchmaker will generally want to deviate from positive assortative matching, which can lead to coarse matching, or pooling. Previous work (Damiano and Li [13] , McAfee [30] , Hoppe, Moldovanu and Ozdenoren [22] ) have studied random or coarse matching as a feasible mechanism that might be adopted due to institutional or practical constraints, but this analysis shows that pooling can be the optimal choice for markets where one or more of the conditions for virtual surplus to be supermodular are violated and the matchmaker would actually find it profitable to utilize non-assortative matching which can arise even if supermodularity and the monotone likelihood ratio property hold. Damiano and Li [13] consider the question of pooling, but in their framework the assumptions of two continua of agents and multiplicatively separable surplus, which obscures the details of the matchmaker's incentives; in particular, they characterize the matchmaker's incentives to pool along the manifold of matches made in the set [q I ,q I ] × [q J ,q J ], which is not readily extended to a setting with a finite number of agents. Consider the following example:
, where α > 0, and let types be exponentially distributed with parameter λ. Set all matching costs to zero, and chooses so that all matches generate positive virtual value. Then the surplus functions are increasing and supermodular, but do not satisfy decreasing supermodularity as α > 0. Then virtual surplus on the I side takes the form
which is submodular whenever q i + q j < 1 + α λ Let y 1 = q I(1) +q J(1) and y 2 = q I(2) +q J (2) . Then the change in profits from switching from negative assortative to positive assortative matching is
Then the optimal unconstrained matching function is
But this matching function violates the monotonicity constraint: By reducing λ, the probability that ∆(y 1 , y 2 ) < 0 can be made arbitrarily close to 1, and positive assortative matching is rarely selected. Suppose all agents but i report honestly. If agent i reportsq i = 0, he can "trick" the matchmaker into choosing the positive assortative match, for which he pays only the entry fee to the market. Consequently, it is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium to report honestly for all types, and any profit-maximizing mechanism will require some coarse matching.
The example shows that the combination of adverse selection and price discrimination present in matching markets can generate situations where the matchmaker's preferences over matchings and the participants' are exactly opposed, but this is not common knowledge until all the types are revealed. Moreover, this arises only as a consequence of the matchmaker's attempts to price discriminate: In Section 3.4, it is shown that a welfare-maximizing matchmaker always prefers the assortative match when surplus functions are supermodular. These details provide an explanation for why intermediation fails in some markets, or why some intermediaries take a "hands off" approach and provide a platform for self-promotion, such as jobs websites like Monster.com.
Even when virtual surplus is supermodular, the matchmaker may have incentives to restrict the supply of matches. The fact that the matchmaker refuses to put some agents together despite generating positive value is similar to an auctioneer's decision to set a strictly positive reserve price, even if his value for the item for sale is zero. To warrant matching, the two agents must satisfy
Let the reserve functions R Ik (a i ), k = 1, 2, ..., K, be implicitly defined by
This sequence of functions essentially describes a supply schedule of matches that depends on both of the agents' reports to the matchmaker, giving the lowest type of partner for which the matchmaker will arrange a match.
and likewise for the J side. Then R Ik (q i ) is decreasing in q i . If the worst-off agent who participates has a quality strictly greater than 0, his quality q I satisfies
The condition in Eq. (7) is a consequence of allowing for externalities within the match. When one party to a match raises his report, there are two effects: The match becomes more valuable, and his partner's bargaining position improves against the matchmaker. In particular,
is ambiguous in sign. In such a case, an agent might want to lower his report to offset effect of a high report by his partner to ensure a match occurs, leading to coordination problems within each match and potential violations of incentive compatibility. This is because each agent's type appears in the informational rent term of his partner, and raising a report can reduce the matchmaker's profit, regardless of whether the match is socially valuable. So Eq. (7) provides a bound on how quickly the informational rent can grow relative to the value of the match in a partner's report so that the second effect never dominates. If this condition were violated, the monotonicity condition could be violated as well (and consequently the conditions for incentive compatibility), resulting in another motive to adopt coarse matching. Interestingly, the efficient matchmaking scheme in Section 3.4 does not require this condition, implying that it arises solely as a consequence of the matchmaker's efforts to price discriminate. Figure 1 illustrates that there are two kinds of exclusion in the model. The mechanism exhibits absolute exclusion if there exists a set of types of strictly positive measure which prefer not to participate, in the sense that they expect non-positive surplus from the mechanism almost surely. Relative exclusion is realized after the type-announcements are made: Some pairs of agents are barred from matching, since their joint virtual surplus is too low, despite generating positive social surplus. Figure 1 shows an example where some agents on the J side face absolute exclusion and will never receive a partner by participating in the mechanism, while every agent on the I side has a non-empty set of types on the J side that he could be paired with.
Optimality of TAM in the Constrained Problem
With TAM sufficiently characterized, it can be verified whether or not the monotonicity condition is satisfied under the sufficient conditions so far developed. Let
This is the probability of coming in rank k out of K I draws from distribution F I with value q. The density of the k-th of K J order statistics is:
While Section 3 shows when TAM is optimal when the monotonicity condition is ignored, it remains to be shown that the constraint is actually satisfied. Theorem 3.5 provides a set of criteria that guarantee TAM satisfies the monotonicity constraint and a revenue equivalence result: Theorem 3.5 (Sufficient Conditions and Revenue Equivalence) Under the assumptions of supermodularity, decreasing supermodularity, the monotone likelihood ratio property, and Eq. (7), TAM satisfies the monotonicity condition. In any profit-maximizing mechanism, agents are matched assortatively and the interim expected transfers equal
This theorem holds because the supermodularity property of the surplus functions and the firstorder stochastic dominance properties of distributions of order statistics ensure that the mechanism assigns more favorable lotteries over partners to agents who submit higher reports, and this increases the matchmaker's profits. This aligns the matchmaker's incentives with those of the agents, and they have no profitable deviations from honestly reporting their quality if everyone else is honest. The proof uses the fact that agents care about the quality of a partner rather than their "name", and TAM makes the assignment on the basis of ranking the agents' reports. Without this property, agents would have to worry about the realizations of all other agents' qualities and identities, rather than just their ranks, making markets where agents are ex ante heterogeneous or have package preferences much more complicated.
Achieving Efficiency Through Price Discrimination
The above analysis is framed in terms of a monopolist matchmaker trying to maximize his profits.
In many applications of a theory of matchmaking, the central authority may be organized by some organization or government, such as the National Resident Matching Program or the junior academic recruiting process in economic departments. In electricity markets, for example, governments often empower a third-party regulator to design a market that matches electricity generators and distributors or consumers, and gives any economic profit back to the government. Suppose that
Figure 2: Welfare-Maximizing vs. Profit-Maximizing Matchmaking the matchmaker has been mandated to maximize ex ante surplus. Since the equilibrium transfers are derived from the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints, independent of the objective function of the matchmaker, almost all the work done for the profit-maximizing matchmaker applies here, except the reserve function. Then the social planner faces the objective function:
As long as the surplus functions are supermodular and the cost schedule is weakly increasing, the optimal rule is:
The joint surplus has to justify the matching cost to warrant a match, leading to a new reserve function, implicitly defined by
The reserve function R * Ik (q i ) is always decreasing, so there is a unique lowest-quality partner for every q i that results in a successful match. The welfare-maximizing mechanism can be shown to be incentive compatible by showing that m * ijk (q I , q J ) satisfies the monotonicity constraint using the same arguments as Theorem 3.5.
In Figure 2 , the pairs between R I and R * I go unmatched when the monopolist decides the allocation, but are matched by the social planner. The quasi-linearity assumption on utilities ensures that over the region in which both mechanisms match agents, the payments made by the agents to the matchmaker fall, and in the region where the efficient program matches the agents but the monopolist doesn't, the total surplus is completely lost. Also interesting is the fact that R * Ik (q i ) is decreasing without requiring any extra conditions such as Eq. (7) in Proposition 3.3. This shows that the need for conditions such as Eq. (7) stem from the matchmaker's attempts to price discriminate, rather than simply the presence of the externalities between partners.
If s I (q i , q j ) = q i and s J (q i , q j ) = −q j , then this framework resembles a double auction, similar to the models studied in Gresik and Satterthwaite [19] , McAfee [29] , Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams [36] , Satterthwaite and Williams [38] , and Cripps and Swinkels [12] . A common theme in that literature is that double auctions are efficient as the number of traders becomes large, since the probability that a given trader's bid affects the clearing price goes to zero. The reason is that the double auction is, in some sense, a direct generalization of the Myerson and Satterthwaite bargaining game. The traders consider whether they will be the "marginal agent" who is setting the clearing price, and attempt to extract rents from their potential partner by bidding strategically, in the same way that agents in the Myerson and Satterthwaite framework try to over-or under-state their values to extract more rents for themselves. In the optimal mechanism of this paper, however, fully efficient and profitable trade can result by pushing agents to compete against their opponents on their side of the market, even in the case of externalities through bidding games (See the indirect implementations of Section 4).
A welfare-maximizing matchmaker is profitable in expectation if
The left-hand side is the total expected surplus, and the right-hand side are the total information rents paid to the agents. Ex post, this can be positive or negative in general, since if one side of the market is generating positive surplus and the other side is generating negative surplus, the net transfers may be negative. In a matching market where both sides generate positive surplus and costs are zero, the sum of payments from each match will always be positive, and the welfare-maximizing outcome can be achieved with no external funding. Considering the case where s I (q i , q j ) = q i +s and s J (q j , q i ) = −q i , matching costs are zero, and types are distributed uniformly on [0, 1], this simplifies to
The right-hand side is half the expected number of trades when matched efficiently. In the limiting case where there are an infinite number of agents on both sides, the equality holds exactly when s = 0, but numerical calculations show that for finite market sizes the equality is only satisfied if s is sufficiently large (though common knowledge of gains from trade are not required). Interestingly, the intermediary is using price discrimination to achieve the socially optimal solution: Profits made on the high value trades potentially balance out losses on later trades, subsidizing low-value or high-cost agents with proceeds from high-value or low-cost ones. This offers an interesting perspective on the "marketing agenices" imagined by Vickrey [44] . He concluded that efficient intermediation would be impossible because "the average price paid to suppliers will exceed the competitive equilibrium price" (p. 13), but that analysis assumes one price prevails. By price discriminating, the welfare-maximizing matchmaker can potentially achieve both socially efficient trade as well as non-negative profits. Moreover, "second-best" institutions exist where the matchmaker is tasked to design the reserve criterion to maximize social surplus subject to achieving zero profits in expectation. Since the profit-maximizing matchmaker achieves strictly positive profits, it is simply a matter of choosing the appropriate reserve functionR Ik (q) so that R Ik (q) ≤R Ik (q) ≤ R * Ik (q) to satisfy the zero expected profit constraint.
Comparative Statics
In the framework developed above, a number of comparative statics predictions can be made concerning how exclusion and payoffs change under the profit-maximizing mechanism when the size or quality of the markets changes. An absolutely continuous distribution F hazard rate dominates an absolutely continuous distribution G if, for all x,
Hazard rate dominance implies the more commonly used first-order stochastic dominance, but is more closely related to the payoffs and strategies of the agents since the inverse of the hazard rate figures into the informational rents extracted by market participants. Absolute and relative exclusion don't depend on K I or K J , similar to the result that reserve prices in auctions do not depend on the number of participants. This result is surprising, since it might be anticipated that if one side were much larger than the other, payments might be depressed on the larger size. In fact, the matchmaker doesn't face this trade-off on exclusion, but on which kinds of bidding games implement the optimal outcome (see the discussion following Theorem 4.1). This result mirrors Crawford [9] , in that increasing the size of one side of the market generally reduces the interim expected payoffs of agents on that side, but increases the interim expected of agents on the other side. When the hazard rate decreases for all types, higher types become more likely. It might be expected that this would have unambiguous effects in increasing profit or the other side's payoffs, but that happens to fail. The reason is that the matchmaker responds to such a change in the market by increasing exclusion, thereby reducing the likelihood of a match. So while the matches made will be better in expectation, fewer are likely to be made. This provides an interesting insight into matchmaker behavior: Intermediaries will always be interested in fostering market size, but may be more reticent about changes that improve the quality of one side since that improves that side's bargaining power.
Indirect Implementation with Position Auctions
Especially in matching environments, finding ways for the agents to reveal their information without relying on a direct revelation mechanism is important. The information held by the agents in the market might be abstract and difficult to communicate or measure, requiring some other means of allowing them to express information to the matchmaker. This section provides a class of games that achieve the same outcomes as the direct revelation matching mechanism described in Section 3, but take the form of bidding games.
Since the optimal direct revelation matching mechanism depends on the ranks of the agents' reports, it turns out that position auctions are one appropriate tool to implement the profitmaximizing allocation. Broadly defined, a position auction is an indirect mechanism where agents submit a single bid to win one of a sequence of goods that are decreasing in value for all participants, the bids are ranked, and bidders receive the good associated with their rank.
Consider the all-pay (winners-pay) position auction:
1. The matchmaker announces a bid-reservation schedule, φ AP Ik (b i ) (φ W P Ik (b i )), giving the lowest bid a J-side agent can make as the k-th match and still be eligible to match to an I-side agent making a bid of b i .
2. Agents submit a sealed bid b i to the matchmaker.
3. The matchmaker opens all bids b i and b j and ranks them from greatest to least, tentatively matching the highest-bidding agent on the I side with the highest-bidding agent on the J side, the second-highest bidder on the I side with the second-highest bidder on the J side, and so on.
4. The matchmaker checks that the bids satisfy the bid-reservation schedule for all tentative matches. If so, he announces publicly that those agents are matched; otherwise, he reveals nothing. All agents pay their bids (All matched agents pay their bids).
Executive search contracts, for example, have common characteristics with this format. Employers are often asked to write the yearly wage for a successful hire, with the understanding that the intermediary's fee is proportional to the announced wage, often running as high as 30 percent of the first three year's wages. Employers are then submitting strategic bids for talent which incorporate the competitive nature of the market as well as the intermediary's cut of the joint surplus.
Theorem 4.1 (Profit-Maximizing Implementation)
The all-pay position auction has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that implements the profit-maximizing matches and payments, with a symmetric bidding strategy given by
where the bid-reservation schedule is given by
(q) is increasing in q, then there is a symmetric equilibrium in the winner-pay position auction that implements the profit-maximizing matches and payments, with bid-reservation schedule
These equations appear complicated, but are closely related to the bidding strategies in first price auctions. In the all-pay auction, the agent constructs his optimal bid by computing the expected surplus generated by his participation, and then shading his bid by the amount he wishes to keep for himself. To get to the winners pay bid, he then divides by the probability he receives a partner at all. While certainly not a trivial series of thought experiments for a participant, the behavioral interpretations of the terms in the bid function make it likely that the format could be used with suitably sophisticated agents.
The winners-pay implementation, however, may fail to implement the profit-maximizing outcome if b W P I (q) is non-increasing. Since the winners-pay bid function is the all-pay bid function conditioned on the probability of winning any partner, an increase in an agent's quality can lead to a large increase in the likelihood of winning but only a modest increase in surplus conditional on having won. If this occurs, the winners-pay bid function can have a negative slope, and consequently there is no strictly increasing equilibrium in pure-strategies. This may occur if many agents are likely to be excluded on one side of the market or the market is "unbalanced" in the sense that K I is much larger than K J . In particular, suppose that exclusion is not profitable, so that R Ik (q i ) = 0 for all types q i . Then the winners-pay bid function has derivative
If K I = K, the term k w I,k (q i ) is 1 and k w ′ I,k (q i ) = 0 by the binomial theorem, and the bid function is increasing. But when K I > K, negative terms are dropped from k w ′ I,k (q i ), which then becomes positive, threatening to make the numerator negative. Behaviorally, agents face a situation where a small increase in their type leads to a large increase in the probability of making a payment but not necessarily a large increase in the desirability of their partner, leading to "discouraged" bidding which potentially undermines the monotonicity of the proposed bid functions. Since allpay auctions will not be feasible in some markets -for example, procurement markets where the projects desired by one side of the market are not substitutable -intermediation may be impossible when one side is much larger than the other. One way to avoid this problem is to first run an auction on the larger side for the right to participate in the smaller, balanced market, or otherwise restrict participation.
Despite the drawbacks of an all-pay format, many matching environments have such characteristics: Many head-hunters collect fees up front, agents searching for opportunities on the Internet pay service providers by expending time looking at the screen or waiting in auction queues, students spend many years making costly payments to educational institutions to be matched to good employers, and researchers or entrepreneurs looking for grants often have to complete significant portions of the preliminary research to exhibit their project's fitness to investors.
In many environments, however, the optimal formats described above are not practical. First, if agents can prove what they bid ex post to other, unmatched agents, the matchmaker's ability to keep socially valuable but unprofitable matches apart is undermined. Second, implementing the profit-maximizing amount of exclusion requires a large amount of information that the matchmaker may not have in practice. If a matchmaker can't get around these problems, the best he can do is prevent low-quality agents from transmitting their information though participation in the mechanism to the other agents. In terms of the direct revelation mechanism, he can set minimum types on each side who are allowed to submit a report, and in terms of the bidding game, he can set minimum bid levels. Since virtual surplus is still supermodular under the assumptions of Theorem 3.5 and the reserve function is weakly decreasing, assortative matching will still be profitmaximizing and incentive compatible. Consequently, the simplified match function then takes the form:m
Matchmaker expected profits in this simplified direct revelation mechanism are then equal to
Consider the simplified all-pay (winners-pay) position auction:
1. The matchmaker announces a minimum bid or entry fee for each side, (b I , b J ), giving the lowest bids that agents can make and still be eligible to participate.
3. The matchmaker opens all bids b i and b j and ranks them from greatest to least, matching the highest-bidding agent on the I side with the highest-bidding agent on the J side, the second-highest bidder on the I side with the second-highest bidder on the J side, and so on, until the supply of agents on one side is exhausted.
All agents are charged their bids (Any matched agent is charged his bid).
Then the following holds:
Theorem 4.2 (Simplified Implementation) Absolute exclusion is higher in the simplified direct revelation mechanism than the profit-maximizing direct revelation mechanism and profits are lower. The identities of the worst-off types are determined by the system of equations:
The simplified all-pay position auction has a symmetric equilibrium that implements the simplified direct revelation mechanism, with bidding strategies
is increasing, then the winners-pay format has a symmetric equilibrium that implements the simplified direct revelation mechanism where players use b W P I (q).
The simplified mechanism reduces the problem of exclusion to choosing two minimum bids, thereby removing the need for the auctioneer to deduce each agent's type from his bid and the equilibrium strategies before deciding whether a match should be allowed. Likewise, the process of mapping the bids into a match is much more transparent, reducing the likelihood that bidders will protest the outcome. This simplification, however, comes at the cost of more exclusion and lower profits. However, the fact that exclusion unambiguously increases is a useful result. One way of regulating a matchmaker like an Internet Service Provider might be to force them to reduce the complexity of their pricing schedules. In response, however, the matchmaker will increase absolute exclusion, leading to negative welfare consequences across the market in the form of higher payments and excluded customers who previously received service. 
Conclusion
This paper shows how matching in the presence of adverse selection can be analyzed with a mechanism design framework, and useful comparative statics and implementation results derived. While many papers have previously tackled these topics, they have often been in highly stylized models, such as Caillaud and Jullien [4] , dealt with matching through costly signaling in markets without an intermediary, such as Hoppe et al. [21] , or considered mechanisms in which the communication between the agents and the matchmaker is restricted in some way, as in Damiano and Li [13] or Gomes [18] . Using standard assumptions from the mechanism design and auction literature, the framework studied in this paper yields a number of useful conclusions about equilibrium matching with incomplete information, as well as illustrates how to implement the profit-maximizing and efficient mechanisms through practical bidding games. The analysis also uncovers some of practical limits of implementations such as the winners-pay and all-pay formats by illustrating how the winners-pay format can fail to have a strictly monotone equilibrium, providing some insight into why intermediaries adopt different kinds of payment schedules.
Similar to the auction literature, further progress on issues of ex ante heterogeneity among participants and more complicated demand structures can be technically difficult. Extensions to many-to-one matching will encounter the same challenges as the multi-unit and combinatorial auction literatures. The special feature of TAM that rankings decide the allocation of partners will break down in settings with complementarities or demand reduction, since the allocation of a given agent will be decided by the marginal values of the participants, which in turn depend on how all other agents are allocated.
Besides these technical issues, matching with two-sided adverse selection affords opportunities to study other issues that are difficult or impossible to capture in many current frameworks. This model could be considered as a process of network formation where nodes with private information compete to be assigned a link. This interpretation of matching appears in results such as Hall's marriage theorem, and offers a way of interpreting this paper as a study of network design with incomplete information. Networks with incomplete information are common throughout the economy. For example, many jobs are found through informal networks, where agents are connected to one another through some structure that allows them to observe each others' characteristics.
Here, agents' overlapping relationships create networks of intermediaries, where if one agent is aware of two unmatched agents, he has incentives to try to arrange a match (provided the payoff is large enough). As the networks of relationships overlap, it becomes a competitive situation where intermediaries are forced to propose the best matches and reveal their information honestly. A framework similar to Kranton and Minehart [27] could be used to investigate when overlapping connections help or hinder agents connecting, and how market efficiency improves or degrades depending on the structure of the network and the distribution of private and public information.
The presence of the matching cost schedule c played a small role in the analysis, but the costs of matching in a decentralized market can be economically important. To ensure the efficient match in a decentralized market, K I K J communications would be necessary (on top of some form of costly signaling), while with the matchmaker, only K I + K J are required. For large markets, this centralization could be a substantial reduction in costs. Moreover, if the cost of applying to a single firm is high enough, workers might be deterred from sending too many resumes, and would subsequently run the risk of receiving a worse partner than they might deserve. Constructing a model of decentralized communication and matching and comparing it to this centralized one can provide an explanation why some markets are highly organized and centralized, while other have no intermediation at all.
Finally, competition is a central issue to models of matchmaking. If a single monopolist is making large profits only on the strength of their position as a middleman between agents, entry is inevitable. While mechanism design frameworks often struggle with competition, the fact that the "goods" in these markets are other agents suggests that stable and competitive markets with multiple matchmakers operating are possible. If the matchmaker offers differentiated services or is careful to set exclusion to deter entry, he might be able to maintain his position. Likewise, an entrant might target specific segments of the market, rather than try to capture all agents at once. Depending on how agents respond to different entry strategies, an entrant may be successful at getting a foothold in the market.
6 Appendix: Proofs
first-order stochastically dominates h(q, K) ; having a higher q places more weight on the "high" rankings, corresponding to 1, 2, ... Proof First, note that KI k=1 w I,k (q) = 1, by the binomial theorem. Then
For k = 1 and k = K I , the functions w I,k (q) are monotone increasing and decreasing, respectively. Let the sequence of points {q k } KI −1 k=2 be defined asq
This is a decreasing sequence in k. For a given q, find the interval [q k ,q k+1 ] and label the accompanying k as k * . Now, for all the terms w
is negative. Then as we drop negative terms from the end of the sum,
Proposition A2 F J,(ℓ) (q) first-order stochastically dominates F J,(ℓ+1) (q).
Proof I'll show that f J,(ℓ) (q) likelihood ratio dominates f J,(ℓ+1) (q), from which the conclusion follows. Note that
Take x < y. Then, since the (ℓ) distribution beats one more agent and the (ℓ + 1) distribution loses to one more agent,
Since cumulative density functions are non-decreasing, F J (y) ≥ F J (x), and
So F J,(ℓ) (x) likelihood ratio dominates F J,(ℓ+1) (x), which implies first-order stochastic dominance.
This sequence is non-increasing in k.
Proof By calculation,
Integrating by parts yields
Because of the first-order stochastic dominance of F J,(k) over F J,(k+1) and supermodularity, this entire term is positive.
Proposition A4 Let F J,(k),KJ (q) be the distribution of the k-th order statistic, when there are
Since likelihood-ratio dominance implies first-order stochastic dominance, the result follows.
Proposition A5 Under TAM and for an integrable function h(q i , q j ),
Proof Under TAM, the matching rule is:
Then the indicator function can be broken up into two events
The above equation shows that for each agent on the other side, named j, there are K = min{K I , K J } ways to match to him: i can do it as the best ranked agent on the I side, as the second-best, and so on. Since the agents are symmetric, there are K J terms for each of the ranks, and probability 1/K J that each agent j achieves that rank, leading to
Since the J-side agents are all symmetric and the expectation of an indicator function is a density,
The remaining expectation can be written as
The indicator function 1 {ρq J (qj )=k} is activated whenever the particular component q j takes the k-th slot less than K J . The support of q J can be divided into K J ! disjoint sets that correspond to all the rankings of the components of the vector of qualities. These permutation transformations have a Jacobian of | ± 1|, so that their joint distribution on the set on which the indicator function takes the value one, rather than zero, is
) which is the distribution of the order statistics. Taking this transformation and making a number of routine changes of order of integration leads to
Dividing the remaining term by (1 − F J,(k) (R Ik (q i ))) makes it into a conditional expectation. Substituting this into a previous equation yields
Therefore, the expectation can be written as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 (Incentive Compatibility)
Proof Only if: Assume incentive compatibility holds; I now show (i) and (ii) hold. Define q as the agent's true quality, andq as the report submitted to the mechanism operator. If the mechanism is locally incentive compatible, maximizing with respect to the reportq in the indirect utility function yields
Taking the total derivative of the indirect utility function then yields
Integrating with respect to q yields the indirect utility function, (i):
(ii) Using (i) and the indirect utility function, interim expected transfers can be written
Then lying and submitting a report q ′ yields an expected payoff of
Then lying is unprofitable if
This is condition (ii), the monotonicity condition. If: Assume (i) and (ii) hold; I show incentive compatibility holds. Using condition (i) and the indirect utility function, transfers can be solve for explicitly. Then deviating to q ′ rather than reporting q gives a change in payoff of
By (ii), the last line is non-positive, implying that reporting q ′ = q isn't a profitable deviation.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof (i) Consider an agent i who draws the worst type in SRD who is allowed to participate, q I . It is a weakly dominant strategy for q I to report q i =q I . For if he deviates from q i toq I , the matchmaker imputes values s J (q j ,q I ) and s I (q I , q j ) to the agent. If he is allowed to choose at the k-th round of SRD, the matchmaker consults the imputed values and matches i to the J-side agent with the highest report, so his reportq i is not technically used -all the I side agents agree on the best remaining J side agent, and would all make the same choice. Suppose a J-side agent is allowed to choose in the k-th round of SRD and agent i has not yet been chosen. If agent i reportsq I , that means that up to round k only I side agents have been allowed to choose so far, since i has reportedq I and has not yet been picked. Thus, the remaining J side agents include the k-th, k + 1-st, ... and J best partners on the J side. Then with probability 1 he will be chosen by whichever agent on the J side who is allowed to choose since they are drawn with equal probability. This gives him a lottery over potential partners with probability 1/(J − k) of receiving each of the remaining J-side agents. If he reports truthfully, then the only time a J side agent chooses him deliberately is when all of the other agents on the I side have been exhausted, so he gets the worst partner with probability 1 (or none at all) conditional on him being allowed to move last. Therefore, the worst-off type finds it profitable to deviate and make the best report. Consequently, truth-telling is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of SRD.
(ii) Consider an agent i who draws the worst type who is allowed to participate in the Gale-Shapley algorithm, q I . Suppose he is a proposer. If he deviates toq I , the matchmaker will impute the best possible quality to him, and (in virtual time) all of the J-side agents will place him at the top of their lists, including the best J side agent. In the first round, all the I side agents propose to the best J side agent, who accepts i's proposal, and they will be matched by the algorithm. This is a profitable deviation, so truth-telling is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the Gale-Shapley algorithm for the proposers. Likewise, if agent i reportsq I on the accepting side rather than on the proposing side, in the first round of the algorithm (in virtual time), all of the J side agents propose to him and he accepts the best J-side agent's proposal. Since he receives no further proposals, he is matched to the best J side agent, and this is a profitable deviation. Consequently, truth-telling is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
(iii) Consider the VCG mechanism. The matchmaker uses the reports to compute
This gives a matching function m * ijk (q I ,q J ). If agent Iℓ refused to participate, the matchmaker would instead solve
Note that his report affects nothing in the second line, but the first line includes
This is a strictly increasing function in his report. Therefore, if he makes an arbitrarily large report, he will be matched to the best possible partner as well as improve payment. Therefore, honest reporting is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the VCG mechanism.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof First, note that the cross-partial derivative of ψ I (q i , q j ) is
From the assumption that s I (q i , q j ) is supermodular, the monotone likelihood ratio property of F I (q), and the added assumption of ∂ 3 s I /∂q 2 i ∂q j ≤ 0, the cross-partial of virtual surplus is positive, so virtual surplus is also supermodular.
It is obvious that leaving any two agents unmatched who satisfy ψ I (q i , q j )+ψ J (q j , q i ) ≥ c k is suboptimal, since these agents could be matched and revenue increased. Likewise, matching any pair of agents who satisfy who satisfy ψ I (q i , q j ) + ψ J (q j , q i ) < c k is suboptimal, since this reduces revenue for the matchmaker. Now consider any match scheme other than truncated assortative matching, where all the current matches are generating positive revenue and no pair of unmatched agents could be profitably matched. It necessarily includes two pairs (q i1 , q j2 ) and (q i2 , q j1 ) with, say, q i1 > q i2 but q j1 > q j2 , with associated match costs c k1 and c k2 . Consider the change in virtual surplus from switching to TAM, where both matches are still profitable after the switch:
Since virtual surplus is supermodular, the integrands are positive, and this swap has increased revenue. Therefore, any switch toward TAM raises the value of the objective function when no matches are destroyed. Suppose, however, that such a switch results in the lower pair generating virtual surplus of ψ I (q i2 , q j2 ) + ψ J (q j2 , q i2 ) < c k2 , so the choice is between one good match and two mediocre matches. By way of contradiction, suppose that choosing the one good match lowers profits, or
But this is a contradiction, since the integrands are positive, and ψ I (q i2 , q j2 ) + ψ J (q j2 , q i2 ) < c k2 , so the one good match over two mediocre matches must be more profitable after all. This argument shows that any proposed match can be improved unless it is identically TAM. Therefore, TAM is profit-maximizing in the unconstrained problem.
Proof of Proposition 3.4 (Reserve Function)
Proof The k-th reserve function is implicitly defined as:
Totally differentiating with respect to q i and rearranging yields
The terms ∂ψ I (q i , q j )/∂q i and ∂ψ J (q j , q i )/∂q j are positive from the monotone likelihood ratio, supermodularity, and decreasing supermodularity, but the terms ∂ψ I (q i , q j ) ∂q j and ∂ψ J (q j , q i ) ∂q i are ambiguous; for instance,
To ensure the above term is positive, the above can be rearranged as
If this condition and its analog for the J side hold, R Ik (q i ) is decreasing, so it is almost everywhere differentiable. Then if R Ik (0) <q J , 0 participates, and he is the worst-off type. Otherwise, the worst-off agent on the I-side can only match to the best agent on the other side of the market, namelyq J . So this player must satisfy ψ I (q I ,q J ) + ψ J (q J , q I ) = c 1 .
Proof of Theorem 3.5 (Sufficient Conditions and Revenue Equivalence)
Proof The proof relies on the Appendix Propositions:
first-order stochastically dominates h(q, k) ; having a higher q places more weight on the "high" rankings, corresponding to 1, 2, ...
and Proposition A5, which allows computation of expectations under TAM. The strategy of the proof is to show that the integrand is negative for all values of z between q and q ′ , implying that the entire integral is negative.
Case 1: Assume q ′ > q. Then it needs to be shown that
If the integrand is negative for all z, then the conclusion for this case follows. This is true if, for all z > q,
, and it suffices to show that
Since q ′ > z, the distribution over j on the left-hand side first-order stochastically dominates the distribution on the right-hand side (Proposition A1). The remaining terms on each side form a decreasing sequence in j (Proposition A3). The two sums can be considered as expectations over a decreasing sequence, with the right-hand side placing more weight on early terms in the sequence. Therefore, the inequality holds.
Case 2: Assume q ′ < q. Then it needs to be shown that
This would be true if for z < q the integrand was positive, or Similarly, take the condition
Verification that the denominator is positive comes from the conditions in Proposition 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.7 (Market Size)
Proof (i) The interim indirect utility of agents on the I side is
Since a change in K J doesn't affect exclusion, only f J,(k) (y) is altered. The first-order stochastic dominance property (from Proposition A4) implies that probability is shifted onto higher realization of partner quality, and because of supermodularity, this function increases in K J .
(ii) Let
Then w I,k:KI (q) = w I (q, k, K I )
Note that
Letq k be the value of q that satisfies the above inequality with an equality. That sequence of points iŝ q 1 =q I ,q 2 = F −1
..,q KI +1 = 0. So for any q, the interval q ∈ [qk,qk +1 ] can be found. For all terms k <k, the probability of that agent attaining that rank has fallen due to an increase from K I to K I + 1; for all terms k ≥k, that agent has become more likely to hold that rank. This entails a shift in probability from favorable, highly ranked partners to unfavorably ranked partners. Since the sum on the left (associated with K I ) must place more weight on the better partners than the term on the right (associated with K I + 1). Note also that for this reason, cutting off the sums at any particular K < K I implies K k=1 w I,k:KI (q) ≥ K k=1 w I,k:KI +1 (q). In other words, the lottery associated with K I + 1 first-order stochastically dominates the lottery associated with K I over the terms 1, 2, ..., K I . Note also that qJ R Ik (q) ∂s I (q, y) ∂q i f J,(k) (y)dy is a decreasing sequence in k. Then let U I (q, K I ) be the interim utility of an agent on the I-side when there are K I agents in the market: The agent has drawn his private information, but has not received any other information about his opponents. Suppose that K I > K J , so that min{K I + 1, K J } = K J . Then {ψ I (q i , q j ) + ψ J (q j , q i ) − c k } f I,(k) (q i )f J,(k) (q j )dq i dq j
An increase in K I or K J leads implies first-order stochastic dominance by Proposition A4 without affecting exclusion, and since the integrand is supermodular, the value of all existing matches improves. If the small side of the market has increase, profits also increase because there are more matches made in expectation.
Proof of Proposition 3.8 (Own-Side Effects)
Proof Note that from Proposition 3.6, absolute and relative exclusion is higher under F 1 I than F 2 I . This reduces the welfare of newly excluded agents and raises the payments of the remaining agents. Additionally, consider
Then w I1,k (q) ≥ w I2,k (q) if k is greater thañ
Since hazard rate dominance implies first-order stochastic dominance, F I1 (q) < F I2 (q) but 1 − F I1 (q) > 1 − F I2 (q), and the above expression is positive. So for k ≤k, w I2,k (q) will be less than w I1,k (q), but for k ≥k, w I1,k (q) will be greater than w I2,k (q). This means that for all q, the lottery over partners is more favorable under F I2 (q) than F I1 (q), given that the agent participates under F I2 (q). So the added exclusion doesn't benefit the remaining bidders, and the interim payoffs of the I-side agents fall.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 (Profit-Maximizing Implementation)
Proof Consider first the all-pay position auction. Note that the minimum bid schedule is equivalent to the reservation function in the optimal mechanism, so we can work with R Ik (q) instead of b J (b i ) in the agents' maximization problems. In any symmetric, increasing equilibrium, the bidders' common strategy b 
Absolute exclusion in the optimal mechanism comes from Proposition 3.4, where the left-hand side of the above equation is set equal to zero. Since the left-hand side is increasing in q I and the right-hand side is strictly positive, exclusion here is higher.
The payments in the simplified mechanism can be computed similarly to the optimal mechanism to get Using this, the same arguments as in Section 1.3 show the monotonicity constraint fails to bind for the simplified direct mechanism, so it is incentive compatible. In the all-pay format, it is an equilibrium to bid the expected transfer exactly, and it is increasing by similar arguments to Theorem 1.4.1, so the all-pay format implements the same payments and allocations as the simplified direct mechanism. The minimum bid is derived as the boundary condition to the solution of the differential equation characterizing the bid function, using the condition that the worst-off type get a payoff of zero.
